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Abstract
Experiments with real and computational agents are used to examine
the impact of changing the level of a non-employment payoff on the
evolution of cooperation between workers and employers
participating in a sequential employment game with incomplete
contracts. Workers either direct work offers to preferred employers
or choose unemplojrment. and receive the non-employment payoff.
Subject to capacity limitations, employers either accept work offers
from preferred workers or remain-vacant' and receive the non-
employment payoflf. Matched workers and. employers participate in
an employment relationship modeled as a prisoner's dilemma game.
• In both types of experiments, increases in the non-employment payoff
result in higher imemployment and vacancy rates while at the same
time encoura^ng higher rates of cooperation among the workers and .
employers who do form matches. However, the behaviors exhibited
by the computational agents are coordinated to a higher degree than
the behaviors of .the human subjects.. This difference , raises.
challenging questions for both human-subject and computational
experimentalists.
Keywords: Labor market; unemployment rate; vacancy rate; evolution ofcooperation; efficiency
wage; search ^d matching; endogenous interaction networks; evolutionary game;
human-subject experiments; computational experiments; agent-based computational
economics.
1. Introduction
1.1. Overview
It is now commonly understood that the complexity of most employment relationships forces the
typical employment contract to be incomplete. If the contract does not enforce the desired level of
cooperation, it is reasonable to think other institutions mightarise to do the job. Using experiments with
both real and computational agents, we examine the possibility that the level of non-employment benefits
affects the level of cooperation between workers and employers, thereby impacting the unemployment
rate, the productivity of labor, and a variety of other economic outcomes.
Our fiamework is consistent with that of MacLeod and Malcomson (1998). Both workers and
employers can shirk. Intuitively, wecanthink ofa worker as offering hardwork in exchange for a bonus,
and an employer as offering a bonus in exchange for hardwork. Wemodel the employment relationship
between a worker and employer as an iterated prisoner's dilemma game. Axelrod (1984) shows that
cooperation can evolve in this environment if the perceived probability of future interactions with any
given current partner is sufficiently high, and if agents do not discount this "shadow of the future" too
heavily.
A distinctive feature of our employment game relative to previous studies, however, is that matches
between workers and employers are not determined exogenously by random selection or some other
extraneous device. Rather, workers pro-actively direct work offers to employers, which the employers
can either accept or reject. Over successive trade cycles (work periods), workers form assessments
regarding which employers are more preferable to make offers to, and employers form assessments
regarding Which workers aremore preferable to acceptoffers from. At anytime, workers and employers
can also chooseto stopparticipating in the labormarketandinsteadcollectthe non-employment payoff.
Because we view this analysis as a baseline, we consider a labor market with a balanced structure.
There are equal numbers ofworkers and employers. In each trade cycle, each woricerhas one work offer
and each employer has one job opening. Any worker or employer who does not enter an employment
relationship receives the non-employment payoff. Workers and employers make their shirking choices
simultaneously so that neither has a strategic informational advantage. One assumption that does bias the
market slightly in favor of employers, however, is that a worker must pay a small offer cost (search cost)
each time that he makes a work offer.
In this labor market, theii, full employment with no job vacancies is possible. Nevertheless, the
unemployment rate and the particular set of agents in employment relationships endogenously evolve
over Ae trade cycles. Two interdependent choices made repeatedly by the workers and the employers
shape this evolution^ process: namely,, their choices of partners; and their behavioral choices in
interactions with these partners.
A major difference between experiments with human subjects and experiments with computational
agents is that learning processes must be fully articulated for computational agents. Our computational
workers and employers are self-interested expected utility maximizers. In analogy to human subjects,
each worker and employer is permitted to evolve his work-site strategy over time. This evolution
involves both inductive learning (experimentation with new strategies) and social learning (mimicking the
strategies ofmore-successful agents of one*s own type).
Because human subjects may not be expected utility maximizers and may select their strategies in
manners quite different from what is programmed into our computational agents, we should not expect
the results from our computational experiment to mirror in precise form the results of our human-subject
experiment. Nevertheless, as stressed by Duffy (2001), we can determine in principle.the source of any
observed regularity arising in the computational experiment. Thus, both similarities and differences in
results can be informative.
Two important findings are obtained from both the computational and human-subject experiments.
First, an increase in the non-employment payoff increases both the unemployment rate and the vacancy
rate while at the same time encouraging cooperation among the workers and employers whomanage to
match. In particular, a high non-employment payment channels, agents either towards productive
cooperative behavior or tbw^ds inactivity. • Second, in the short and intermediate run, a low non-
employment payoffappears preferable to eithera zeronon-employment payoffor a highnon-employment
payoff. A zero non-employment payoff encourages too much shirking, while a high non-employment
payoff results in too high a risk oflost production due to coordination ^ure.
The results of the two ^periments also differ in interesting ways. ,For example, the outcomes for the
computational experimeiit display a much more stable and structured response to changes in the non-
employment payoff than the outcomes for the human-subject experiment: In each treatment, outcomes in
the computational experiment typically gravitate towards one of two "attractor states." In.the treatments
with zero and low non-employment payoffs, the two.attractor states are similar: the first is characterized
by latched pairs of mutually cooperative workers and employers, while the second is characterized by
latched pairs of workers and employers who mtermittently defect andcooperate. Alternatively, when the
non-employment payoff is high, the first attractor.state is characterized by latched pairs of mutually
cooperative workers and employers while the second attractor state is a state of economic collapse in
which each -worker and employer ultimately becomes inactive. _In contrast, in the human-subject
experiment, most relationships that form between workers and employers are short-lived, ending when
one or both ofthe participants shirk.
This latter finding raises interesting questions. Towhat extentare the human-subject and computational
experiments capturing the same economic structure but reporting over different time scales, short run
versus long run? In particular, couldit be that the "shadowof the past" weighs heavily on human subjects
over our relatively short human-subject trials, biasing behaviors towards unknown past points of
reference? If so, the computational experiment may indeedprovidean accurate prediction ofwhatwould
happen in the human-subject experiment over a longertime span. Alternatively, the two experimentsmay
differ structurally in some fundamental way so that differences would be observed regardless of time
scale. In particular, wemightask, "Is the representation of agent learning in the computational experiment
too inaccurate to permitvalidcomparisons withhuman subjects?" Theseand otherchallenging issues are
addressed in the final sections ofthis study.
The design of the human-subject experiment is presented in Section 2, and results for this experiment
are reported in Section 3. Section 4 outlines the design of the computational experiment, and Section 5
reports the results for this experiment. The results for the two experiments are compared andcontrasted
in Section 6. Section 7 contains concluding remarks.
1.2. RelatedLiterature
Because no worker or employer knows for sure in our employment game how any potential partner
will behave, the employment contract is incomplete. Mutually cooperative employment relationships
yield rents relative to employment relationships of mutual defection and relative to the non-employment
payoff. However, shirking is preferable to not shirking for each individual in any single trade cycle,
which is particularly apparent in the final trade cycle. If it is common knowledge that all are self-
interested, the incentive to cooperate recursively breaks down, beginning with the final trade cycle and
ending with the first. The subgame perfect equilibrium is therefore a state where, in all trade cycles, all
those in employment relationships shirk. When the non-employment payoff is higher than the mutual
defection payoff, the unemployment and job-vacancy rates in this equilibrium are 100% and all agents
earn the non-employment payoff. Conversely, when the non-employment payoff is below the mutual
defection payoff, the unemployment and job-vacancy rates are both 0% and all agents earn the mutual
defection payoff.
To the extent cooperation can evolve, agents can improve their welfare relative to the common
knowledge Nash equilibrium where all are self interested. Kreps et al. (1982) have shown that
cooperative play can besupported ina finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma ifanagent believes there is at
least a small probability that the other may becooperative; e.g., aTit-for-Tat player. The rent that can be
earned is an external incentive that motivates the cooperation, rationally leading the agent to expect the
other to be cooperative. The seminal work of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) uses this external incentive to
explain involuntary unemployment and efficiency wages: Efficiency wages arise so as to create tiie
unemployment that must develop so that employment yields the rent necessary to deter shirking.
Extending this work, Albrecht and Vroman (1998) show that shirking can be an equilibrium phenomenon
and multiple wage levels can result when workers are heterogeneous with respect to how much disutility
they associate with work. Carmichael and MacLeod (1997) show that a gifl-giving custom or an
equivalent job search cost can promote cooperation because they increase the rent associated with a long-
term employment relationship,
As an alternative to rent seeking, R^bin (1993) has shown that a preference for "feir" outcomes can
motivate cooperation. Here, an internal incentive motivates the cooperation, associated with the belief
that defecting (shirking) is unfair. Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1993) adopt this approach and present a
^'feir-wage effort" hypothesis as an alternative to the shirking version of the efficiency-wage hypothesis of
Shapiro and Stiglitz. In their expe^ent, they found support for the fair-wage effort hypothesis in that it
was common for a subject to behave cooperatively even when there was no rent to seek. To date,
numerous experiments have demonstrated that both feiraess concerns and self-interest motivate people.
Fehr and Gachter (1998) review a number of studies. Goeree and Holt (2000), Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000), and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) each demonstrate that adding inequity aversion to a self-interest
model can help explain human behavior in a variety of experimental settings.
In an experiment comparable to ours, Falk, Gachter, and Kovacs (1999) find that human subjects
exhibit fairness concerns and this increases workereffort levels. They also find that compared to a one-
shot interaction, repeated interaction with the same employer enhances worker effort. While our
fiamework allows for repetition, it also introduces the realistic feature that any long-term employment
relationship between a worker and an employer must arise endogenously. A priori, then, it is not clear
whether the long-term relationships that can facilitate cooperation wiU arise. We focus on whether or not
a change in the non-employment payoff can affect the evolution of cooperation by affecting the
willingness of employers and workers to enter into cooperative employment relationships.
2. The Human-Subject Experiment
The human-subject experiment was implemented by having human subjects play anemployment game.
2.1. Subjects
The experiment contained three treatments. Five sessions were run for each treatment, and each
session mcluded six new (i.e., inexperienced) subjects. Thus, a total of 90 human subjects participated.
All subjects were University ofNevada student volunteers. The time ofplay for a session ranged from 45
minutes to 70 minutes. Subjects were paid based upon their perfoimance. Subject earnings averaged
$14.40, ranging from $5 to $26.
Subjects completed a demographics questionnaire so we could determine whether particular behaviors
or outcomes were correlated with particular demographic characteristics. The 90 subjects ranged in age
from 18 to 63, with the mean age being 24.6. They were 57 percent male and 43 percent female. The
racial background was 74.4 percent Caucasian, 6.6 percent Hispanic, and 18.8 percent Asian. Marital
status was 70.0 percent single, 16.6 percent married, 5.5 percent divorced, and 7.8 percent living with
someone. Forty-three percent were receiving financial aid. The number of hours worked per week
ranged from 0 to 60, with a mean of 18.3 hours. Work experience ranged from zero to 47 years, with a
mean of 7.7 years. The number of college credits taken ranged from tiiree to 160, with a mean of 67.7
credits. The GPA on college credits ofthe participants ranged from 2.0 to 4.0, with a mean GPA of3.3.
2.2. .Apparatus
The employment game was constructed using network programming languages. Worker and employer
subjects communicated through a series of interconnected web pages. This allowed for the quick tr^fer
of labor market information between employers and workers, ease in recording the labor market
information, and control over the process through which workers and employers interacted. Worker
subjects were assigned the identities Workerl, Worker2, and Worker3, while employer subjects were
assigned the identities Employerl, Employer2, and Employers. The six subjects participating in a
session were randomly assigned to these six roles.
All ofthe subjects were in the same computer lab, stationed at six different computers. Subjects could
see each other. However, the computer terminals were located fer enough apart that the only information
a participant could obtain was from his or her own computer terminal. Subjects were forbidden from
revealing their individual employer or worker identities. Verbal communication with other participants
during the session was also forbidden. Subjects were asked not to make any verbal comments or gestures
during the game that would give away their identity. Subjects could only communicate with the
administrator and could only do so privately.
2.3. Procedures
After being randomly assigned a role, participating subjects read a detailed set of game instructions.
After any questions were privately answered, the employmentgame was played. Subjects then completed
a demographics questionnaire and were paid for their performance.
The employmentgame consisted of twelve trade cycles. Each trade cycle provided an opportunityfor
workers and employers to obtain earnings. A tradecycle consistedof two parts: A matching process and
an employment process.'''The matching process detennined whether or not a particular worker obtained a
job and whether or not a particular employer filled ajob opening. The employment process determined
the earnings obtained by employedworkers and activeemployers.
Thematching process usedwas a variantof theGMe-Shapley (1962)matching process. Eachworker
had one work offer that could become employed. Each-employer had one job opening that could be
filled. In the first matching roM«6?, 'each worker either'submitted their offer to one of the employers or
selected the no option. Whenever the no offer option was selected, the workerexitedthe matching
process. " " . • . .
The offers submittedby workers accumulated oh theworkoffer lists of the employers. Because there
were three workers, ^'individual employer"could receive 0, I-, 2, or 3 work offers.' An employer not
receiving any offers sat out during the given round. Employers receiving offers had to decide whetherto
accept or reject"them. Because each employer had only dhe opening, any employer receiving more than
one offer had to reject at le^ one offer. ' " .
Whenever an offer was rejected, a new matching round commenced. In the new round, each worker
who had his or her offer rejected had to either'redirect the offer to.another employer (or back to the same
employer) or exit the matching process by selecting the no offer option. ' Ah employer who received a
redirected offer tiien Had to either accept or reject-it. To 'accept, the' employer either had to have a
vacancy or had to displace an existing offer. When an offer was displaced, the worker originally
submitting the offer was informed and had to decide what to do with the offer in the next matching round.
Additional matching roimds commenced imtil each work offer was either accepted or redirected to the no
offer option. That is, the matching process ended when ho new offers were made. Thus, the number of
matching rounds occurring during a"trade cycle was'endogenously determined.'
At the end of the matching process, workei^ ^d employers who were not inatched received the non-
employment payoff. The job openings of ^y unmatched employers where labeled vacant for the given
trade (^cle. The non-employment payoff received by an employer can therefore be interpreted as an
employer subsidy paid to mitigate the hardship associated with" not obtaining earnings fi"om an
employment relationship. An employer receiving the non-employmentpayoffwas labeled wacrive if the
employer never received a work offer and discouraged if work offers were received but rejected. A
workerreceiving the non-employment payoffwas labeled ifthe no offer-option was chosen in the
first round. Because the inactive worker's' offer is never actually" made to'any employer, the inactive
worker does participate in the labor force. A worker receiving the non-employment payoffwas labeled
unemployed if the no offer option was chosen in- a round subsequent to the first trade cycle. The
unemployed worker actively seeks work but does not obtain a job in the tr^e cycle. • For the inactive
worker, the non-employment payment'can be thought-of as a welfare payment. For the unemjiloyed
worker, the non-employment payment can be thought of as unemployment compensation. In each case
this payment to the worker mitigates the hardship associated with not obtaining earnings .from an
employment relationship.
Each matched worker-employer pair entered into an employment relationship. The amount of
earnings generated during the trade cycle by the relationship and the distribution of the earnings between '
theemployer andworker depended uponthetype of relationship that formed. Bothemployer and worker
had a simple choice to make, 'To shirkor not to shirk." If neither employer norworker shirked, 80points
were generated and both employer and worker received 40. If both employer and worker shirked, 40
points of earnings were generated and both employer and worker received 20. Under this payment
scheme, the cooperation associated with not shiridng is more productive than the defection associated
with shirking. For both employer and worker, the motivation to not shirk stemmed from the fact that
cooperation led to higher productivity and consequently higher income. The motivation to shirk was
introduced by assuming that shirkingby onlyone of the two parties skewsthe distribution of the earnings
toward the shirker. Specifically, when one shirked andone didnot, the earnings generated was 70 points,
ofwhich the shirker received 60 and non-shirker received 10. In summary, the employment relationship
entered by a matched employer-worker pair was a prisoner's dilemma. Cooperation, in the form of non-
shirking behavior, offered potential rewards, but was also risky relative to defection in the form of
shirking.
2.4. Design
For self-interested subjects, it is clear that the values of 10 and 20 for the non-employment payoff are
critical. If the non-employment payoff were less than 10, self-interested workers and employers would
always prefer participating in an employment relationship to being inactive. As long as the non-
employment payoffis less than 20, an employment relationship where worker and employer shirk yields a
higher payoffto worker and employer than inactivity, and attempting to enter an employment relationship
is not risky relative to inactivity unless the subject chooses not to shirk. Alternatively, if the non-
employment payoff exceeds 20, attempting to enter an employment relationship is necessarily risky
relative to choosing inactivity, for 20 or less is earned when the other shirks. We have then three
qualitatively different situations. To examine these three situations, we set die non-employment payoff
equal to 0 for our ZeroT treatment, 15 for omtLowT treatment, and 30 for our HighT treatment. Table 1
presents a summary ofour experimental design.
- INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUTHERE -
Given this design, predicting subject behavior is not easy. Whether or not the non-employment
payoffaffects the willingness of subjects to enter into employment relationships or affects the willingness
of subjects in employment relationships to cooperate depends upon the uhobservable beliefs and
strategies used by the subjects.
3. Results from the Human-Subject Experiment
We are interested in how the three non-employment payofftreatments afifectedthe outcomes
experienced by the human subjects. However, outcomes depend uponsubjectbehavior,- andsubject
behaviormay depend upon the types oftrading networks that form. Therefore, we begin by presenting
results on network formation. We then present results on subject behavior and outcomes.
3.1. Network Formation
We characterized network formation in"the human subject experiment'by examining the last four of the
twelve trade cycles in each session. The relationship between a given worker and given employer in a
session was classified as latched, recurrent, or transient. If the worker and employer entered into an
employment relationship with each other in the last two trade cycles, the relationship was classified as
latched. If the worker and employer did not enter into an emplojonent relationship with one another ia
any of the last 4 trade cycles, the relationship was classified as transient. If a relationship was neither
latched nor transient, it was classified as recurrent.
Because there were three workers and tiiree employers in each session, there were nine woricer-
employer relationships to classify per session. Thus, over tiie five sessions in a treatment, there were 45
relationships to classify. Table 2 shows the percentage of the 45 relationships that fall into each of the
three categories.
- INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE -
Given our definitions, at most 33 percent of all potential relationships can actuallybe latched, for if a
worker becomes latched to one employer, hemust be recurrent or transient withthe othertwo employers.
We found that relationships were more likely to be transient when the non-employment payoffwas
higher. Below, we will see this is primarily because a higher percentage of subjects moved toward
inactivity as the non-employment payoffwas increased; The relationship between the level of the non-
employment payoffand the prevalence of latched relationships wasnot monotonic. Latched relationships
were least prevalent in the HighT treatment and most prevalent in the LowT treatment. Recurrent
relationships were most prevalent in the ZeroT treatment. In relative terms, then, we found that the
HighT non-employment payoff level promoted a transient trading network, the LowT level promoted a
latchednetwork, and the ZeroT level promoted a recurrentnetwork.
In the HighT treatment, network formation varied very little across the 5 sessions. Two-thirds of the
relationships were transient infour ofthe five sessions, and the fifth session was nearly the same. Inthe
ZeroT treatment, four ofthe five sessions were comparable inthatthere were no latched relationships and
78 to 89 percent of relationships were recurrent. One session inthe ZeroT treatment was quite different
in that 33 percent of the relationships were latched. None of these latched relationships was mutually
cooperative, however. Network formation in the LowT treatment varied the most. In one session, 22
percent oftherelationships were latched and 11 percent were recurrent, while inanother no relationships
were latched and 89 percent were recurrent. Except for the latter session, what was consistent in the
LowT treatment was thatat least 11 percent ofthe relationships ineach session were latched andmutually
cooperative.
Another way to examine relationship formation m the human-subject experiment is to examine the
number ofemployment relationships that lasted at least two consecutive periods. There were 30 ofthese
relationships inthe ZeroT treatment, 26 in the LowT treatment, and 17 inthe HighT treatment. Ofthese
relationships, 17 percent were mutually cooperative in the ZeroT treatment, 23 percent in the LowT
treatment, and 18 percent inthe HighT treatment. Alternatively, 29 percent were relationships ofmutual
defection in the ZeroT treatment, 15 percent in the LowT treatment, •and 30 percent in the HighT
treatment. Themean relationship length was 2.56 in theHighT treatment, 3.00 in the LowT treatment,
and 2.89 in the ZeroT treatment. Ifwe define a long-term relationship as one lastingthree trade cycles or
more, 18 percent were long-term in the HighT treatment, 31 percent in the LowT treatment, and 20
percent in the ZeroT treatment.
Summarizmg, we found that increasing the non-employment payoff both decreased the rate of
relationship formation and increased the likelihood that a relationship would be transient. However, the
impact of the non-employment payoff was not monotonic regardmg the types of relationships that
formed. The LowT treatment hadthehighest incidence of latched relationships, long term relationships,
and mutually cooperative relationships.
3.2. SubjectBehavior
In any given trade cycle,, we classified the behavior of human subjects who entered employment
relationships into fourmutually exclusive categories:
1. Unprovoked Defection: Shirking at the first meeting or shirking when the other did not shirk at the
last meeting.
2. Reciprocal Defection: Shirking when the other shirked atthe last meeting.
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3. Unprovoked Cooperation: Not shirking at the first meeting or not shirking when the other shirkedat
the last meeting.
4. Reciprocal Cooperation: Not shirkingwhenthe other did not shirk at the last meeting.
The subjects in this trade cycle who did not enter any employment relationships were classified into three
additional mutually exclusive categories.
5. Unemployed Worker: A worker not entering into an employment relationship after having pursued
one.
6. Discouraged Employer: An.employer not entering into an employment relationship even though at
least one work offer was received.
7. Inactivity: For workers, never making a worker offer. For employers, never receiving a work offer.
If cooperation is to evolve, reciprocal cooperation must not be extinguished. Rather, it must become
the norm. For the three treatments. Figure 1 shows the mean rate of reciprocal cooperation as it evolved
over the twelve trade cycles. For each treatment, the mean was calculated over the 30 subjects (15
employers and 15' workers) in all five sessions! We combined employers and workers into one group
because we foimd no statistically significant difference in the shirking tendencies of workers and
employers."
- INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE -
By definition, reciprocal cooperation cannotoccur in the first trade cycle. By the third trade cycle, the
rate of reciprocal cooperation was clearly highier in the ZeroT and LowT treatments than in the HighT
treatment. The rate of reciprocal cooperation was comparable in the ZeroT and LoWTtreatments until the
final trade cycle was approached. At tibat point, subjects in the ZeroT treatment moved away fi*om
reciprocal cooperation. However, the rate of reciprocalcooperationpersisted in the LowT treatment.
Multinomial logistic regression is a usefiil tool for determining what fectors influence tiie prevalence
ofany one of the seven types of behavior relative to any other. This regression method requires that one
of the behavioral categories be selectedas'a reference group. Because we are interested in examining the
evolution of cooperation, we selected reciprocal cooperation as ourreference behavior. Table 3 presents
the relative risk ratios associated with pertinentindependentvariables.
~ INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE -
Regression 1 informs us of the prevalence of the various types of behavior relative to reciprocal
cooperation. A positive number indicates the particular behavior was more prevalent than reciprocal
cooperation. Thus, we find that, ofthefour types ofbehavior that can beexhibited byemployed subjects,
reciprocal cooperation was generally the least prevalent, regardless of the treatment. We do find some
differences across the treatments, however. Reciprocal defection was significantly more prevalent in the
11
ZeroT and HighT treatments than in the LowT treatment. Unprovoked cooperation was significantly
more prevalent in the HighT treatment than in the LowT and ZeroT treatments.
There are three types of non-employment behavior. Regression 1 indicates the prevalence of
unemployed workers, discouraged employers, and inactivity were significantly lower than reciprocal
cooperation in the LowT and ZeroT treatments. In the HighT treatment, the prevalence of inactivity was
significantly higher than reciprocal cooperation, while the prevalence of unemployed workers and
discouraged employerswas approximately equal to the prevalence of reciprocal cooperation. Thiis, the
prevalence of unemployed workers, discouraged employers, and inactivity were significantly lower in the
LowT and ZeroT treatments than in the HighT treatment.
Regression 2 adds the variable CYCLE to regression 1, where CYCLE takes on the trade cycle values
1 through 12. Regression 2 indicates that subjects react to what they experience and significantly
change their belmvior over the twelve trade cycles. Only the prevalence of unemployment relative to
reciprocal cooperation was unaffected. Relative to reciprocal cooperation, unprovoked defection and
unprovoked cooperation each become significantly less prevalent, while reciprocal defection,
discouragement among employers, and inactivityeach becomesignificantlymore prevalent.
For the most part, we found demographic variables had no significant impact on the behavioral choices
of the subjects. In particular, age, sex, race, marital status, financial aid status, weekly work hours, years
ofworkexperience, number of college credits, andwhether or not the subject had beenan employer in the
realworldhadno impact. As shown inRegression 3, however, we did find that the student's GPAhad an
influence. Relative to reciprocal cooperation, higher GPA students were significantly more likely to
exhibit unprovoked defection than lowerGPA students andwerealso significantly more likely to become
unemployed.
In additionto differingwith regard to demographic characteristics such as sex, age, and GPA, human
subjects candiffer in terms of what motivates their behavior. Fehr and Gachter (1998) contrast homo
economicus and homo reciprocans, the former being self-interested and the latter being motivated by
feimess concerns. Fehr and Schmidt (2000) found it usefiil to categorize decision-makers as fair or
selfish when attempting to explain choices in situations withincomplete contracts.
Following this approach, we assume that unprovoked defection is unkind^ while unprovoked
cooperation is kind. We assume the fah* type will not tend to exhibit unprovoked defection, but will
exhibit unprovoked cooperation. Defecting is the Nash equilibrium choice for a single play of our
prisoner's dilemma employment game. Thus, we assume the selfish type will tend to exhibit unprovoked
defection. Of course, because our experiment involves repeated play, a self-interested subject may
exhibit cooperative behavior for some time in an effort to encourage others to be cooperative, only to
defect at the end. However, because we cannot discern the dynamic intentions of subjects, we
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simplistically assume the selfish type will not tend to exhibit unprovoked cooperation. Likewise, we
assume the selfish type will not tend to exhibit reciprocal cooperation. We.assume both selfish and feir
typeswill exhibit reciprocal defection.
These assumptions allowed us to classify the human subjects according to their behavioral choices
over the twelve trade cycles. Specifically, we classified, a subject as selfish if there were more acts of
aggressive defection than combined acts ofaggressive cooperation and reciprocal cooperation. A subject
was classified as^/r if the opposite were true. A subject was classified as half-selfish and half-fair if the
number of acts of unprovoked defection equaled the number of acts of unprovoked cooperation and
reciprocal cooperation. The variable FAIR is the average percentage of session subjects who were
classified as feir. Over all five sessions, an average of 47 percent of the subjects in a session were
classified as fair, a percentage consistent with summary findings fi"om a number of previous studies
reported by Fehr.and Gachter (1998).
Regression 3 indicates that, when a session contained a higher- percentage of fair subjects, the
likelihood of reciprocal cooperation was higher relative to all other behaviors. This is, of course, not too
surprising given ourdefinitions ofiselfish and fair types. What is more interesting is that the relative risk
ratios on the FAIR variable are especially large (in absolute value) for the nonremployment behaviors.
This indicates that a strongerpresenceof fair.types tends to be associated with a higher employment rate.
Using Regression 3, it is now desirable to re-examine the treatment effects after controlling for the
significantbehavioral impacts of the variablesCYCLE, GPA, and FAIR- With only a single exception,
we now find that the four employment behaviors are equally prevalent. That is, once we control for a
subject's GPA and for the extent to which FAIR types are present in his session, the subject has a
statistically equal probability of exhibiting unproyoked defection,, reciprocal defection, unprovoked
cooperation, or reciprocal cooperation. The single exception is that <unprovoked cooperation is
significantly more prevalent in.the HighT treatment. '
3.3. Outcomes
We next compare a variety of outcomes for the three treatments. For workers, we examine labor force
participation rates, unemployment rates, the accumulation of offer costs, and m^ket power. For
employers, we examine job vacancy rates,,discouragement-rates, and market power. For all subjects
combined, we examme the shirking rate, the rates of mutual cooperation, mutual defection, and single
defection, mean productionand total production, andmean utility.
Therewere three workers per sessionandfive sessions per treatment. Eachworker had to decidehow
to allocate a singleworkoffer,each trade cycle. Thus, there were 15 offers per trade cycle, or 180 offers
over thetwelve trade cycles in a given treatment. Wedefine the labor force participation rate for a trade
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cycle to be (15-number of inactive workers)/15. To be unemployed the worker must seek work. Thus,
we define the unemployment rate for a trade cycle by the ratio that includes the numberof unemployed in
the numerator and 15minus the number of inactive workers in the denominator. Figures 2 and 3 present
the labor force participation rates and unemployment rates for the three treatments.
- INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE -
- INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE -
Regression analysis indicates that there was no significant change in the labor force participation and
unemployment rates over the twelve trade cycles in the LowT and ZeroT treatments. However, in the
HighT treatment the rate of participation significantly decreased while the rate of unemployment
significantly increased. By the twelfth trade cycle, the rate of participation in the HighT treatment was
substantially lower than in the other two treatments, while the rate of unemployment was substantially
higher. Even though the difference in the rate of participation between the LowT treatment and ZeroT
treatment appears slight, regression analysis indicates that this difference was significant at a 5% level.
Thedifference in the unemployment rates between the LowTandZeroTtreatments was also significant.
One might expect a higher payoff for non-employment to discourage labor force participation and
encourage unemployment. Moreinteresting is the fact that increasing the non-employment payment from
zeroto the low level had onlya small impact, while increasing it from the low level to the high level had
a muchmore significant impact. It is also significant that the difference between the HighT treatment
and the other two treatments increased over the twelve trade cycles. This indicates learning mayplay a
role in determining the extent to which a higher non-employrnent payoff discourages labor force
participation.
Because the number of potential job openings equals the number of potential work offers, the job
vacancyrate must equal the sum of the unemployment rate and the worker inactivity rate. Consequently,
we fmd that the vacancy rate was positively correlated with the non-employment payoff. Moreover,
whereas the vacancy rates in the LowT and ZeroT treatments remained fairly stable, tiie vacancy rate in
the HighT treatment increased over successive trade cycles. A job vacancy in the ZeroT treatment was
quite rare.
A job may be vacant either because an employer never receives a work offer or because an employer
refuses all work offers he receives. We refer to the latter situation as employer discouragement. The
discouragement rate is the number of vacancies caused by discouragement divided by the number of
potential job openings. We find that discouragement was consistently rare in both the LowT and ZeroT
treatments, while discouragement became increasingly common in the HighT treatment. In the last three
trade cycles ofthe HighT treatment, employer discouragementwas associated with roughly 40 percent of
thejob vacancies. The remaining 60 percentof vacancies were associated withworker discouragement in
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the sense that some workers chose to be inactive or, stop searching for a job without soliciting each
employer.
The following estimated equation characterizes the mean offer cost incurred, by workers for each
treatment.
OC = 1.21fflGHr + 1.38LOWT + L59ZEROT - 0.007CYCLE, = .39.
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.01)
HIGHT, LOWT,.and ZEROT are,dununy. variables for the ;three treatments, and CYCLE indexes the
trade cycle number running from 1 through 12. Standard e^ors are presented in parentheses. The
coefficients on the treatment dummy variables indicate that increasing the non-employment payment
reduces the mean offer cost incurred by workers. These differences are statistically significant at the 5%
level. The coefficient on CYCLE indicates that the mean offer,cpst decreases with experience. However,
this is result is not statistically significant at the 5% level.
Figure 4 presents the mean shirking rates of employers,and workers over successive trade cycles, by
treatment, where eachm^ is calculated over the subjects who enter-into employment relationships.
-INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUTHERE-
In the HighT and-.ZeroT treatment, the shirking rate increased over successive trade cycles while the
shirking rate in the LowT treatment decre^ed. To examine the significance ofthese trends, we regressed
the shirking rate S on the treatment dununy variables HIGHT, LOWTj-ZEROT^ and on Ae interactions of
these variables with the trade cycle viable, CYCLE.- The results are presented as Regression 1 in Table
4. Only tie increasing trend exhibited in theZeroT treatment is significant at the5%level. However, the
trends exhibited-by the HighT and LpvvT treatments are significant at the 13.4% and 10.0% levels,
respectively. By the twelfth ^d final trade cycle, the mean shirking rate was highest in the ZeroT
treatment ^d by fer the lowest in the LowT treatment.
- INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUTHERE-
Shirking,could occur in,a context,where bodi workers and employers shkk, or it .could occur in a
conte^ whereone type of agent shirks andthe .other-does not. To examine the origin ofshirking behavior
and the evolution of cooperation in more detail, we define, three.possible-relationship types: Mutual
cooperation (JvIC),mutual defection{MD), 2ixi6. single defection {SD).
Under mutual cooperation, neither- type of agent, shirks; . Regression 2. mdicates that the ZeroT
treatment wasmost effective-in prompting mutu^ cooperation in.the initial trade cycles. However, imder
this treatment the rate ofmutu^ cooperation decreased significantly over successive trade cycles. In the
final trade cycle 12, there was not a single incidence ofmutual cooperation even though the labor force
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participation rale was 100% and tte unemployment rate was 0%. In the HighT treatment, in contrast, the
incidence of mutual cooperation was relatively low (about 14% of employment relationships) and did not
exhibit a significant trend. Of interest, however, is tiie feet that the actual rate of mutual cooperation
dropped from its peak level of 33% in trade cycle 11 to a low of0% in trade cycle 12, an indication that
subjects looked forward to their choice onthe last trade cycle. Incontrast to the other two treatments, the
rate of mutual cooperation significantly increased in the LowT treatment. Even in the final trade cycle,
40% of the employment relationships inthis treatment were mutually cooperative.
Undermutual defection, both types of agent shirk. Regression 3 indicates that mutual defection was
rare in the ZeroT treatment in the initial trade cycles. However, the rate ofmutual defection significantly
increased so that by trade cycle 12, mutual defection was more prevalent in theZeroT treatment than in
the other two treatments. The rate of mutual defection also significantly increased over successive trade
cycles inthe HighT treatment. Incontrast, the rate ofmutual defection did not significantly change fi-om
one trade cycle to the next in the LowT treatment. In the final trade cycle 12, the actual rate ofmutual
defection was 87% in the ZeroT treatment, 40% in the HighT treatment, and 17% in the LowT treatment.
When only one agent shirks in a work-site interaction between a worker and anemployer, the shirker
receives the high payoff60 and the non-shirker receives the "sucker" payoff 10. The shirker could be
either theworker or the employer. However, we found no statistically significant difference in the rates
with which workers and employers engaged in such unilateral defections. Thus, we combined all cases
into one single defection category. Regression 4 indicates that the likelihood of a sucker payoff differs
Uttle across the three treatments in the initial trade cycles. However, the likelihood of a sucker payoff
decreases in successive trade cycles in both the HighT treatment and the ZeroT treatment, while it does
not significantly change in the LowT treatment. Consequently, the. regression model indicates that the
rate ofsucker payoffs is higher inthe LowT treatment than the other two treatments during the final few
trade cycles. An interesting anomaly, however, is that the sucker payoff rate was highest in the HighT
treatment during the final trade cycle 12 (60 percent), as a number ofsubjects who had been in mutually
cooperative relationships defected.
Workers and employers could earn points in two ways: namely, from an employment relationship and
from non-employment payments. We can think ofthe points generated by employment relationships as
output produced, while we can think ofnon-employment payment points as value that a government must
obtain elsewhere. How many points are produced from employment relationships depends upon how
many employment relationships are formed and upon the behavioral choices made by the worker and the
employer in these relationships. For a given employment relationship, the most points are produced
under mutual cooperation (40+40=80). The least points are produced under mutual defection
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(20+20^0). A single defection produces an intermediate number of points (60+10=70).- Of course, no
points produced when a worker chooses to make no offer and an employer's job is left vacant.
The total production level over the 106 employment relationships that developed in the HighT
treatment was 7,480, an average of 70.6 per relationship. In the LowT treatment, 157 employment
relationships produced 10,320 points, an average of 65.8 per relationship. Finally, in the ZeroT treatment,
176 employment relationships produced 9,953 points, an average of 56.5 per relationship..' Thus, we find
that increasing the non-employment payoff discourages the formation of employment relationships, but
increased the productivity of the average relationship: Total production was highest in the LowT
treatment.
•Figures 5 and 6 show how mean production and total production varied over the twelve trade cycles.
Mean production in the HighT and LowT treatments remained roughly constant, while mean production
in the ZeroT treatment decreased significantly. Themeanfor the HighT treatment was higher than for the
LowT treatment. This difference is significant at a 10% level but not*ata 5% level.
- INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE-
- INSERTFIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE - -
Total production significantly decreased in theHighTand-LowT treatments, but for opposite reasons.
The productivity of the average- employment relationship was maintained in the HighT treatment.
However, total product decreased because the number of employment relationships declined. In the
ZeroT treatment, the number of-employment relationships was maintained, but the productivity of the
average relationship decreased. By the final few trade cycles, total productionwas highest in the LowT
treatment. In tiiese final few trade cycles, there were fewer employment relationships in the LowT
treatment than in the ZeroT treatment, but the productivity of the average relationship was higher. The
productivity of the average employment relationship was lower in theLowT treatment than'intheHighT
treatment, but there were more employment relationships.
We canusethe average number ofpoints eamed pertrade cycle asa measure oftheutility ofa subject.
There were six subjects in five sessions in three treatments, each earning points in twelve'trade cycles.
This provides us with 1080 observations. Half of these observations ^e on- employers and half on
workers. The following estimated equation"shows how a subject's utility level U'was influenced by the
treatment, byexperience overthetrade cycles, and by'the subject's type (worker oremployer).
'
U= 28.0HIGHT + 29.3LOWT.+ 32.3ZEROT - .07HC - .32LC - .93ZC + 1.95SUB, R^ = .0199 '
(1.85) (1.85) ' '(1.85) (0.24)" (0.24) (0.24) (0.96)
The variables HIGHT, LOWT and ZEROT are treatment dummy variables, while HC, LG, and ZC are
interaction variables obtained by multiplying the treatment dummy variables and the trade cycle variable
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CYCLE. SUB is a dummy variable that is 0 for a worfcer and 1 for an employer. Standard errors are
shown in parentheses.
The very low value indicates that the variation in subject utility levels is not well explained by the
factors we are examining here. We do learn, however, that employers enjoyed a significantly higher
utility level than workers. (This is presumably because workers had to pay an offer cost, wiiereas
employers did not have to pay any comparable cost.) Controlling for this woricer-employer difference,
the average subject in each treatment received about the same utility outcome in the initial trade cycle.
Over the twelve trade cycles, the utility level of the average subject decreases, regardless of the treatment.
However, only the decrease in the ZeroT treatment is significant at a 5% level. Thus, we learn that, by
trade cycle 12, the average subject in the ZeroT treatment is significantly worse off than the average
subject in either the LowT or the HighT treatment. At a 5% level of signijficance, we cannot reject the
null hypothesis that the subjects in the LowT treatment attain the same average utility level as the subjects
in the HighT treatment.
We can examine the market power of a subject by examining how the subject's utility level compares
to what would be received in a competitive equilibrium. We assume all agents would trade costlessly in a
cooperative manner in competitive equilibrium, receiving the 40-point payoff associated with mutual
cooperation in each trade cycle. This allows us to define a market power measure MPow - (U-40)/40,
which is the percentage by which a subject's utility level U exceeds the competitive payoff outcome. The
following estimated equation shows how a subject's market power was influenced by the treatment, by
experience over the trade cycles, and by the subject's type (worker or employer).
MPow = - 30HighT -.26LowT -.19ZeroT - .002HC - .008LC - .023ZC + .049SUB, = .0199
(0.5) (0.05) (0.05) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.024)
Because the market power m^ure MPow is a linear transformiation of the utility level U, the
statistical properties of this regression are the same as the last. The regression indicates that the average
subject does worse in each of our treatments than he would do in a competitive equilibrium. The market
powerof workers is significantly lower than the market power of employers. The highest average market
power level is attained by employers in the initial trade cycles of the ZeroT treatment, though at a 5%
level of significance this market power level is not statistically different than thax of employers in the
ZeroT and LowT treatments. The lowest average market power level is attained by workers in the final
trade cycle 12 for the ZeroT treatment, and this result is statistically significant at a 5% level. We
therefore cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference in the average market power levels
observed in the LowT and HighT treatments.
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4. The Computational Experiment
I
4.1. The ComputationalLaborMarket
The computational labor market closely parallels the general structure of the human-subject labor
market set out in Section 2. Thus,'the market comprises equal numbers of workers and employers. Each
worker can work for at most one employerat any given time, and each employer can employ at most one
worker at any given time. Also, the workers and employers repeatedly seek preferred work-site partners
using a modified Gale-Shapley matching mechanism, engage in efficiency-wage work-site interactions
modeled as prisoner's dilemma games, and evolve their, work-site behaviors over time. Advantage is
taken, however, of the ability to consider greater numbers of workers and employers interacting over
longer periods of time. In addition, unlike the case for human subjects, the learning processes of the
computational workers and employers mustbe explicitly specified.
The computational experiment was nnplemented by means of the TradeNetwork Game Laboratory
{TNGLab), an agent-based computational laboratory developed by McFadzean, Stewart, and Tesfetsion
(2001) for studying the evolution of trade networks via real-time animation, table, and chart displays.'
The specific TNG parameter settings for the experiment at hand are described in the next section. All
other TNG parameter settings are the sameas in.Tesfetsion(2001).
4.2. Implementation Details
Thecomputational labormarket comprises twelve workers andtwelveemployers. Market activities are
divided into a sequence of 1000 generations. Each generation inturn is divided into two parts: (a) a trade
cycle loop consisting ofsuccessive trade cycles; and (b) anevolution step. „.
Each worker and employer in the initial .generation is assigned a work-site rule in the form of a
randomly specified pure strategy for playing an iterated prisoner's dilemma game with an arbitrary partner
an indefinite number of times. This work-site, rule governs the behavior'of the agftnt in his work-site
interactions throughout the entire trade cycle loop for the initial generation. .Each work-site rule is
represented bymeans ofa "finite state automaton"^ with 16 internal states. Thus, the setoffeasible work
siterules for each worker andemployer, while extremely large, is nevertheless finite.
^For research, tutorials, user mstructions, source code, and executables related to the TNG Lab, visit the
TNGhome page athttp://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfetsi/tnghome.htm.
A.finite state automaton is a system comprising a finite collection ofmtemal states together with a state
transition function that gives the next state of the system as a fimction of the current state anH other
current system inputs. For the application at hand^ the latter inputs are the actions selected by a worker
and employer engaged in a work-site interaction.
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Each worker and employer in the initial generation also has an initial expected utility assessment for
each ofhis potential work-site partners. For simplicity, in the experiments at hand, these assessments are
all set equal tothemutual cooperation payoff. ^
The workers and employers in the initial generation participate in 150 successive trade cycles. During
each trade cycle, they engage in two main activities: (1) a matching process, during which they search
for preferred work-site partners on the basis of expected utility assessments; and (2) an employment
process, during which each matched worker-employer pair engages in one work-site interaction. In
addition, during each process, each agent updates his current expected utility assessment for a particular
potential partner every time that he obtains a payoff from an interaction with this potential partner.
The matching process is the same as described in Section 2 for the human-subject experiment, with
one exception. Each computational worker and employerhas a minimum tolerance level, assignedas part
ofthe agent configuration process for the initial generation^ If tiie expected utility assessment assigned
to an employer by a worker ever fells below this level, the worker will stop directing work offers to this
employer. Similarly, if the expected utility assessment assigned to a worker by an employer ever drops
below this level, the employer will stop accepting work offers from this worker. In the human-subject
experiment, the minimum tolerance levels are not under the control ofthe experimenter.
Given these minimum tolerance levels, the manner in which workers direct work offers to employers
in the matching process for each trade cycle follows the modified Gale-Shapley procedure outlined in
Section 2. Each worker and employer has a preference ranking over potential partners, determined by his
current expected utility assessments. Each worker starts by directing a work offer to his most preferred
tolerable employer, if any such employer exists. Each employer receiving at least one tolerable work
offer places his most preferred tolerable work offer on his work offer list and refuses all the rest. Each
worker-having a work offer refiised then redirects this work offer to a next most preferred tolerable
employer who has not yet refused him in the current matching process, if any such employer exists. Once
employers stop receiving new work offers, they accept the work offers currently on their work offer lists
and the matching process comes to a close.
^ This is not an iimocuous specification, since it strongly affects the extent to which tiie workers and
employers engage in e^erimentation withnewpartners. This issue is furflier considered iri Section 6.
In the current experiment, these minimum tolerance levels are consistently set equal to the non-
employment payoff. This specification is meant to capture the opportunity cost idea that entering intoa
risky work-site interaction is viewed by agents as a tolerable gamble if and only if it is expected to yield
at leastas high a payoff as would be eamed through inactivity.
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The employment process for the computational -experiment is the same as for the human-subject
experiment. Once a worker andemployer arematched, their subsequent work-site interaction is modeled
as a prisoner's dilemma game. One of fourpossible payoffe canbe earned in eachwork-site interaction: a
low payoffL=10, earned by an agent who cooperates against a defecting partner; a mutual defection
payoffP=20; a mutual cooperation payoffC=40; or a highpayoffH=60, earned by an agentwho defects
against a cooperating partner. Also, as in the human-subject experiment, a -worker incurs an offercost
OC=1.0 each time that he directs a work offer to an employer, whether or not the work offer is accepted.
A worker or employer who is not matched earns a non-employmentpayoff'i^E? for the trade cycle. Each
worker md employer keeps complete track of each payoff he receives during the course of each trade
cycle, including work-site payoffe, negative payoffe due to offer costs, ^d non-employment payoffs.
Each worker and employer uses a simple reinforcement leaiiiing algorithm to update his expected
utility assessments for potential partners in responseto new payoffs. Every worker and employer initially
associates U°= C with each potential work-site partner with whom he has not yet interacted.
Subsequently, each time an agent v interacts with an agent z, agent v forms an updated expected utility
assessment for z by summing U° together with all payoffs received to date from interactions with z and
dividing this sum by one plus the total number of these inter^ions. The payoffs included in this
summation include both work-site payoffs and any negative payoffs due to offer costs. Consequently, an
updated expected utility assessment for any agent z is simply an average of all payments received to date
in interactions with z, augmented by Ae "prior" payoff expectation U^. This method for updating
expected utility assessments is consistent. That is, if an agent interacts repeatedly with another agent z,
then eventually his expected utility assessment for z will converge to his true average payoff level from
interactions with z.^
At the end ofthe initial generation, the utility level of each worker and employer is calculated to be the
average total net payofe per trade cycle that the agent obtained during the course of the preceding trade
cycle loop, i.e., his total net payoffe divided by 150. The workers and employers then enter into an
evolution step duringwhichthey separately evolve (structurally update) their work-site rules based inp^
on these actual attained utility levels. ' , '
In the evolution step, each worker and employer engages in inductive learning by experimentation
with the use of new work-site rules. In addition, each worker and employer also engages in social
mimicry learning by mimicking aspects of the work-site rules used by more successfiil (higher utility)
SeeMcFadzean and Tesfatsion (1999) for more details. Briefly, consistency ^follows from the finite
stateautomaton representation for work-site rules^ which ensures that the actionpatterns between anytwo
agents must eventually enter into a cycle asthenumber oftheirinteractions becomes sufficiently large.
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agents of his own type. Thus, workers imitate other more successful workers, and employers imitate
other more successful employers.
E7q)erimentationand mimiciy are separately implemented for workers and for employers by means of
genetic algorithms involving commonly used elitism, mutation, and recombination operations. Elitism
ensures that the most success&l work-site rules are retained unchanged from one generation to the next.
Mutation ensures that workers and employers continually experiment with new work-site rules (inductive
learning). Recombination ensures that workers and employers continually engage in mimicry (social
learning).^
At the end of the evolution step, each worker and employer has a potentially new work-site rule. The
memory of each worker and employer is then wiped clean ofall past work-site experiences. In particular,
initial expected utility assessments for potential partners are re-set to the mutual cooperation payoff level
without regard for past work-site experiences. The workers and employers then enter into a new
generation andthewhole process repeats, fora total of 1000 generations in all.'
4.3. Experimental Design
The computational experiment parallels the human-subject experiment in focusing on only one
treatment variable, the non-employment payoffNEP. The three tested values for NEP are 0, 15, and 30,
which are referred to as treatment ZeroT, treatment LowT, and treatment HighT, respectively.
^ See McFadzean and Tesfetsion (1999) and Tesfatsion (2001) for detailed discussions of this use of
genetic algorithms to implement the evolutionof work-site rules.
^Afinal technical remark about implementation should also be noted, incase others wish to rq)licate or
extendthis experiment. The minimum tolerance level is hardwiredto zero in the TNG Lab, the software
usedto implement the computational experiment. Thus, to retain the non-employment payoffNEP equal
to the minimum tolerance level, experiments were actually run with each work-site payoff normalized by
subtraction of NEP. In addition, for better TNG Lab visualization, the work-site payoffs were further
normalized by multiplication by 0.10. For example, C* = 0.10[C-NEP] was used in place of the mutual
cooperation payoffC, and similarly for the other woric-site payoffis. The corresponding normalized non-
employment payoffthen equaled NEP* = 0.10[NEP-NEP] =0. Finally, to maintain consistency with this
normalization, the offer cost OC was normalized to OC*=0.10. Note that it would not be consistent to
subtractNEP from OC, since OC is a cost per work offer. For example, a worker who is refused k times
and never hired during a trade cycle receives a total payoffNEP-kOC at the end of the trade cycle, and
this is the payoff from which NEP must then be subtracted to implement the payoff normalization. This
subtraction occurs automatically whenNEP*=0 is used in place of NEP. In all data tables presented in
Section 5, below, utility levels and market power levels are translated back into non-normalized form
prior to reporting, foreasier comparison with thehuman-subject experimental findings.
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For each treatment, 20 runs were generated using 20 different seeds for the TNG Lab pseudo-random
number generator: namely, {0,5,10,... ,95}. Inthe data tables reported inSection 5, each run is identified
by its corresponding seed value. Each run consists of 1000 generations in total. To investigate
evolutionary change, the twenty runs for each treatment are sampled at three different points in time:
generation 12, generation 50, and generation 1000. For each sampled generation, data is collected
regarding network formation, market non-participation rates, work-site behaviors, welfare (utility and
market power) outcomes, and persistent relationship type counts. Table 5 provides a summary ofthese
basic experimental design features.
- INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE -
5. Results for the Computational Experiment
5.1. Overview
In contrast to the results for the human-subject experiment reported in Section 3, the results for the
computational experiment display a startling degree ofregularity. This regularity is visible asearly asthe
twelfthgenerationand persists throughgeneration 1000.
For each of the three non-employment payofftreatments, the twenty runs essentially cluster into two
distinct attractor states. Each attractor state supports a distinct configuration ofmarketnon-participation
rates, work-site behaviors, utility levels,marketpoweroutcomes, andpers^ent relationship types. These
attractor states can be Pareto-ranked, m the sense that the,average utility levels attained by workers and by
employers are both markedly higher in one of the two attractor states.- Tl^ exact form of the attractor
states varies systematically as a fimction ofthe non-employment payofftreatment.
Beforereportingthese results in detail, it is important to explain care&Uy the descriptive statistics that
have been constructed to help characterize ^e one-to-many mapping between treatment and outcomes.
These descriptive statistics capture many of the same aspects as reported for the human-subject
experiment. With computational agents, however, we can be much more precise about distinguishing
persistentfirom transient relationships and continuous relationships from relationships that are interminent
or random in nature.
5.2. Descriptive Statistics
Definition ofa PersistentRelationship ,
As noted in Section 4, work-site rules in the computational experiment are represented as finite state
automata, implying that the actions undertaken by any one agent in repeated work-site interactions with
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another agent must eventually cycle. Consequently, the actions of any one agent in interactions with
another can be summarized in the form of a work-site history H:P, where the handshake H is a (possibly
null) string of work-site actions that form a non-repeated pattern and the persistent portion P is a
(possibly null) string of work-site actions that are cyclically repeated. For example, letting c denote
cooperation and d denote defection, the work-site history ddd:dc for an agent v in interactions with
another agent z indicates that v defected against z in his first three work-site interactions with z and
thereafter alternated between defection and cooperation.
A workerand employer are said to exhibit a persistent relationship during a given trade cycle loop if
two conditions hold. First, their work-site histories with each other during the course of this loop each
have non-null persistent portions. Second, accepted work offers betweenthe worker and employer do not
permanently cease during this loop, either by choice (a permanent switch away to a strictly preferred
partner) or by refusal (one agent becomes intolerable to theother because of toomany defections).
A persistent relationship between a worker and employer in a given trade cycle loop is said to be
latched ifthe worker works continuallyfor the employer (i.e., in every successive trade cycle) during the
persistent portions of their work-site histories. Otherwise, the persistent relationship is said to be
recurrent.
Classification ofNetworks by CompetitiveDistance
Wewill next construct a measure that permits the classification of experimentally observed interaction
networks into alternative types. This measure calculates the distance between an observed interaction
network among workers and employers and an idealized interaction network capable of supporting a
competitive (fiill employment) market outcome.
A possible interaction pattemamong theworkers and employers in generation G of a runR is referred
to as an (interaction) network, denoted generically byN. Eachnetwork N is represented in tiie form of a
directed graph. Thevertices Vofthegraph represent theworkers and employers. Theedges of thegraph
(directed arrows) represent work offers directed fi-om workers to employers. Finally, the edge weight on
any edge denotes thenumber ofaccepted work offers between the worker and employer connected bythe
edge.
Let N(G,R) denote the network depicting the actual interaction pattem among the workers and
employers in generation G of a run R. The reduced-form network PN(G,R) derived fi"om N(G,R) by
eliminating all edges of N(G,R) that correspond to non-persistent relationships is referred to as the
persistent network corresponding toN(G,R).
Consider the following competitive interaction pattem between workers and employers: Each worker
is recurrently directing work offers to employers, and every worker and employer has at least one
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persistent relationship. This interaction pattern is the pattern that would resuh under "competitive market
conditions" in which every worker and employer is behaving cooperatively, each worker has the same
expected employment rate as any other worker, and each employer has the same expected vacancy rate as
any other employer.
Thenetwork distance for any persistent network PN(G,R) is then defined to be' the number ofvertices
(agents) mPN(G,R) whose edges (persistent relationships) fail to conform to the competitive interaction
pattern. By construction, then, this measure. indicates the ejctent to which PN(G,R)' deviates from the
"null hypothesis" ofa competitive market network. This network distance measure provides a useful way
to classify different types, of persistent networks observed to arise in the computational experiment.
Note, in particular, that a completely recurrent persistent network has a network distance of 0, a
completely latched persistent network has a network distance of 12, and a completely disconnected
persistent network (no persistent relationships) has;a network distance of24. •
MeasurementofMarketNon-Participation Rates
Aworker or employer who feils to form any persistrat relatio^hip during generation G in run R is
classified ,as persistently non-employed for that generation ^d run. The percentage of workers who are
persistently non-employed constitutes the persistent unemployment rate for that generation and run.
Similarly, the percentage of employers who are persistently non-employed constitutes the persistent
vacancy rate for that generation and run.
A persistently non-employed worker is essentially an imemployed worker in the sense of Section 3,
and a persistently non-employed employer isessentially a discouraged employer in.the sense ofS^on 3.
No agent in the computational experiment is inactive in the sense of Section 3 when inactivity is
measured in terms of an entire trade cycle loop. In particular, then, the labor force participation rate is
100% over each trade cycle Ipop.^
^ In the computational experiment, the workers' initial expected utility assessments for potential
employers are all set equal to tiiemutual cooperation payofflevel, C. each treatment, C exceeds the
minimumtolerance level,which is set equal to the non-employment payoff. It follows that eachworker
at the beginning of the trade cycle loop for generationG will always direct at least one work offer to an
employer, even if that worker eventually becomes persistently non-employed. Hius, every persistently
non-employed worker is essentially an unemployed worker in the sense of Section 3, and no worker is
inactive in the sense ofSection 3, when measured in terms of an entire trade cycle loop. In addition, since
all employers in the computational experiment are initially viewed indifferently by workers at the
begiiming of a trade cycle loop, and potential work offers eqiial potential job offers, every employer will
receive at least one work offer in the initial trade cycle of a trade cycle loop. Thus, no employer is
inactive in the sense ofSection3 when measured in terms ofan entire trade cycle loop.
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Classification ofWork-Site Behaviors
A workeror employer in generationG ofa run R is calleda never-provokeddefector (WPD) if he ever
defects against another agent that has not previously defected against him. The percentages of workers
and employers who are NPDs measure the extent to which Aese agents behave opportunistically in work
site interactions with partners who are strangers or who so fer have been consistently cooperative. An
NPD is an unprovoked defector in the sense defined in Section 3 for the human-subject experiment, but
an unprovoked defector need not be an NPD.
An agent (worker or employer) in generation G of a run R is referred to as a persistent intermittent
defector {IntD) if he establishes at least one persistent relationship for which his persistent portion
consists of a non-trivial mix of defections and cooperations. The agent is referred to as a persistent
defector {AllD) if he establishes at least one persistent relationship and if the persistent portion of each of
his persistent relationships consists entirely of defections. Finally, the agent is referred to as a persistent
cooperator (AllC) if he establish^ at least one persistent relationship and if the persistent portion of each
ofhis persistent relationships consists entirely of cooperations. By construction, an agent in generation G
of a run R satisfies one and only one of the following four agent-type classifications: persistently non-
employed; a persistent intermittent defector; a persistent defector; or a persistent cooperator.
Two important points can be made about this classification of agent types. First, in contrast to
standardgame theory, the agents coevolve their types over time. This coevolution is in response to past
experiences, starting fi"om initially random behavioral specifications. Thus, agent typing is endogenous.
Second, agent typing is measured in terms of expressed behaviors, not in terms of work-site rules. An
agent may have coevolved into an AllC in terms of expressed behaviors with current work-site partners,
based on past work-site experiences with these partners, while still retaining the capability of defecting
against a new untried partner. Indeed, work-site rules continually coevolve in the evolution step through
mutation and recombination operations even if expressed behaviors appear to have largely stabilized.
This ceaseless change in work-site rules makes any apparent stabilisation in the distribution of agent
types all the more surprising and interesting.
Measurement ofUtilityandMarket Power Outcomes
As in Section 3, the utility level of a worker or employer at the end of generation G in a run R is
measured by the average total net payoff per trade cycle that the agent earns during the course of the
trade cycle loop for generation G.
With regardto market power,we adopt the standard industrial organization approach: namely, mark«
power is measured by the degree to which the actual utility levels attained by workers and employers
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compare against an idealized competitive yardstick. We take as this yardstick a situation in which there is
absence of strategic behavior, symmetric treatment of equals, and full employment. Specifically, we
define competitive market conditions for the computational labor market to be a situation in which each
worker is recurrently directing work offers to employers, and each agent is a persistent cooperator (AllC).
Ignoring offer costs, the utility level that each worker and employer would attain in these competitive
market conditions is simply themutual cooperation payoff level, C. Therefore, as in Section 3,we define
the market power of each worker or employer in generation G of a run R to be the extent to which their
attained utility level, U, differs firom C: that is, MPow = (U-C)/C.
ClassificationofPersistent Relationship Types
Apersistent relationship between a worker and employer in generation G of a run R is classified in
accordance with the persistent behaviors expressed bythe two participants inthis particular relationship.
If both participants are persistent intermittent defectors (IntDs), the relationship is classified asmutual
intermittent defection If both participants are persistent mutual defectors (AllDs), the
relationship is classified as mutual defection Qid-AllD). If both participants are persistent mutual
cooperators (AllCs), the relationship is classified as mutual cooperation (M-AllC). Notethat the relative
shirking rates for an M-IntD relationship can be deduced for the participant worker and employer by
examining their relative market power levels.
A persistent relationship in which the worker and employer express distinct types of behaviors is
indicated in hyphenated form, with the worker's behavior indicated first. For example, a persistent
relationship involving a worker who is an IntD and an employer who is an AIIC is indicated by the
expression IntD-AUC.
These relationship classifications parallel the reciprocity classifications introduced in Section 3 for
human-subject relationships, with two major differences. First, the relationship classifications for the
computational experiment focus only on persistent relationships; transient relationships are ignored.
Second, these relationships are classified in accordance with the types of behaviors expressed by each
participant in these relationships, where these behaviors are holistically described in terms of the
categories IntD, AllD, and AllC. That is, the focus is on relationships as a whole, not on action^air
counts within relationships.
This is done because agents in the computationaJ experiment evolve their work-site rules holistically,
on the basis of their entire past interaction histories to date. It would therefore be highly misleading to
assume that an action by one agent represents a response only to the immediate past action of his partner.
Indeed, as will be reported in Section 5.3, there is an enormous amount of coordination in the
relationships observed for the computational experiment, in the sense that mutuality relationships totally
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dominate. This indicates that agents are engaging in a high degree of relationship coordination in a
hohstic manner.
In contrast, in the human-subject experiment it is much more difficult to get a handle on which
relationships are trulypersistent. The interaction horizons aresimply tooshort. Moreover, it is difficult to
determine how the workers and employers are actually determining their work-site behaviors.
Consequently, it makes sense to break down observed relationships into action-pair counts in an attempt
to get a handle on the characterization ofthese behaviors.
With these cautions in mind, the concept of "reciprocal cooperation" in Section 3 is essentially
captured in holistic terms by the concept of anM-AllC relationship. Similarly, the concept of "reciprocal
defection" in Section3 is essentially captured in holistic terms byM-AllD relationships and by balanced
M-IntD relationships in which the attained market power levels of workers and employers are essentially
equal, taking offer costs into account.
Finally, the conceptof a **selfish agent" in Section 3 is captured in the computational experiment by a
participant in a persistent relationshipwho has a higher shirking rate than his partner. This can occur in a
variety ofways. For example, a worker participating in a relationship of the form AllD-AllC, AllD-IntD
or IntD-AUC is clearly shirking at a higher rate than the participating employer. Moreover, a worker
participating in anM-IntD relationship canbe inferred to be shirking at a higherrate than the participating
employer ifthe worker is attaininga relativelyhighermarket power level, taking offer costs into account.
5.5. Experimental Findings
Network Formation in the Three Treatments
For each of the twenty runs corresponding to each non-employment treatment, ZeroT, LowT, and
HighT, the form of the persistent network was determined at three sampling points: generation 12;
generation 50; and generation 1000. Using the network distance measure defined in Section 5.2, the
distribution of these persistent networks across runs was then plotted, conditional on treatment and
sampled .generation. Thus, a total of nine network distributions were plotted, three for each of the three
treatments.
These nine network distributions are depicted in Figure 7. Network distance is measured along the
horizontal axes and the number of runs corresponding to this network distance is indicated on the vertical
axes. Recall that a network distance of 0 corresponds to a perfectly recurrent persistent network, a
network distance of 12 corresponds to a perfectly latched persistent network, and a network distance of 24
corresponds to a completely disconnectednetwork (nopersistent relationships).
- INSERT FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE -
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In treatment ZeroT, perfectly latched networks are sttongly dominant even by generation 12. For each
sampled generation, all but one or two of the twenty runs exhibit persistent networks consisting of
perfectly latched worker-employer pairs. This is indicated by the sharp peak in the network distribution
at networic distance 12.
In treatment LowT, perfectly latched networks are agam dominant. Nevertheless, at each sampled
generation, the network distribution is less sharply peaked at network distance ,12 ,than, it was for
treatment ZeroT. ! . ..
In treatmentHighT, anew phenomenon arises. For each sampled generation, seven runs out oftwenty
lie atnetwork distance 24, indicating that the workers and employers inthese runs have failed to form any
persistent relationships. At generation 12, the remaining 13 runs are scattered over network distances
from 0 to 23. By generation 1000, however, the. network, distribution displays^two sharp peaks, one at
network distance 12 (latching) and one atnetwork distance 24 (complete coordination failure).
MarketNon-Participation Rates, Work-Site Behaviors, andMarketPower inthe Three Treatments
Table 6 reports market non-p^cipation rates, work-site behaviors, utility levels, and market power
outcomes for the twenty runs constituting treatment ZeroT, each sampled at generation 12. These
descriptive statistics are reported separately for each of the twenty individual runs comprising this
treatment. More precisely, for each run, the following descriptive statistics are, given:
Persistent imemployment rate for workers (UnE-w);
Persistentvacancy rate for employers (Vac-e);
Acount ofnever-provoked defectors for workers (NPD-w) andemployers (NPD-e);
A count of intennittent defectors for workers (IntD-w) and employers (IntD-e);
A count of always-defectors for workers (AllD-w) andemployers (AllD-e);
A count of always-cooperators forworkers (AllC-w) andemployers (AUG-e);
Mean utility level for workers (Util-w) withstandard Aviation (Util-wSD);
Mean utility levelfor employers (Util-e) withstandard deviation (Util-e SD);
Meanmarket power level attainedby workers (MPow-w);
Meanmarketpower level attainedby employers (MPow-e).
- INSERT TABLE 6 ABOtJT HERE -
The twenty runs are grouped together, first in accordance with their network, distance (NetD), and
second in accordance with the type of work-site behaviors expressed by the workers and employers. This
grouping reveals that tiie runs are essentially clustered into two distinct "attiactor states" comprising 18
runs in total, all exhibiting perfectly latched persistentnetworks. The remaining two runs comprisea mix
of recurrent and latched relationships and appear to be transition states between-^e two attractor states.
The workers attain very low mean market power levels in the transition-state runs. This is due to the
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substantial offer costs they accumulate from refused work offers in the course of maintaining their
recurrerrt relationships.
In the first attractor state comprising four runs, very high percentages of tiie woricers and the
employers are AllCs. Despite theprevalence ofAllC agent types, the employers attain an averse mean
market power level (-0.02) that is markedly higher than the corresponding level obtained by the workers
(-0.14), This is due to the offer costs incurred by workers in the process of forming and sustaining the
persistent latched networks and to the modestly higher percentages ofNPD, IntD, and AllD agent types
among employers.
In the second, more dominant attractor state comprising fourteen runs, very high percentages of the
woricers and the employers are both NPDs and IntDs. Interestingly, the workers and employers obtam
similar average mean market power levels in this second attractor state (-0.22 for workers and -0.20 for
employers). However, these levels are substantially lower than the average mean market power levels
they inthe first attractor state. Thus, in terms ofthis market power measure, the first attractor state
Pareto dominates the second attractor state.
Table 7 reports persistent relationship type counts for treatment ZeroT, sampled at generation 12. As
in Table 6, are reported for individual runs grouped into thetwo attractor states.
- INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERB --
The most striking aspect of Table 7 is the almost complete lack of mixed persistent relationships, i.e.,
relationships in which the participant worker and employer are expressing distinct types ofbehaviors. In
particular. Table 7 reveals that the first attractor state is dominated by mutual cooperation (M-AllC)
whereas the second attractor state is dominated by mutual intermittent defection (M-IntD). Mutual
defection (M-AllD) is almost entirely absent.
The mean market power levels reported in Table 7 reveal, however, that the shirking rates expressed
by the workers and employers in their M-IntD relationships in the second attractor state are not generally
balanced in any given nm. Rather, in about half the runs the workers shirk more than the employers, and
in the remaining half the employers shirk more than the workers. Thus, although the average mean
market power levels attained by workers and employers in this attractor state are very close, this hides an
underlying volatility in relative shirking rates across runs.
The characteristics reported above for treatment ZeroT sampled at generation 12 are largely
maintained in generation 50 and in generation 1000. One interesting observation, however, is that
individual runs can traverse fi-om one attractor state to another as time proceeds. For example, run 30 is
' in the first attractor state in generation 12, appears as atransition state in generation 50, and ends up in the
second attractor state by generation 1000. Conversely, run 60 is in the second attractor state in generation
12 but ends up inthefirst attractor state by generation 1000.
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A second interesting observation is that the number of runs lying in each attractor state evens out over
time. In generation 12, the cooperative first attractor state comprises only four runs while the second
attractor state dominated by intermittent defection comprises fourteen runs. By generation 50, the first
attractor state comprises eight runs while the second attractor state comprises 11 runs. By generation
1000, each attractor state comprises exactly nine runs. Thus, agents on average are improving their
ability to coordinate on mutual cooperation.
As in treatment ZeroT, the twenty runs comprising treatmentLowT, sampled at generation 12, can be
clustered into two attractor states together with a collection of transition states. The runs in the first
attractor state are characterized by perfect latching and a high percentage of AllC agent types in M-AllC
relationships. The runs in the second attractor state are characterized by almost perfect latching and a
high percentage of IntD agent types in M-IntD relationships. The transition-state runs each comprise a
mix of latched and recurrent relationships and have a high percentage of IntD agent types in M-IntD
relationships.
In contrast to treatment ZeroT, however, the number of transition-state runs is larger (six runs instead
of two) for treatment LowT sampled at generation 12. This is consistent with the network distribution
data reported in Figpure 7. The latter data reveal that, for each sampled generation, the p^k at network
distance 12 (latching) for treatment LowT is less pronounced than the peak at distance 12 for treatment
ZeroT. This indicates that the workers and employers in treatment LowT take longer on average to
coordinate intoperfect latched networks thantheworkers andemployers in treatment ZeroT.
Also in contrast to treatment ZeroT, the average mean market power levels attained by workers
employers in treatment LowT, sampled at generation 12, are not balanced in the second attractor. The
employers attain a level of-0.11, whereas the workers attain a markedly lower level of-0.19. The second
attractor is dominated by latched relationships, indicating that each worker is persistently incurring only
one offer cost per trade cycle. Since each offer cost is small relative to trade payoffe, only 1.0, it follows
that accumulation of offer costs does not explain this large discrepancy inmarket power. Rather, since
the second attractor state is dominated by M-IntD relationships, lius discrepancy indicates that the
employers are managmg to shirk at a substantially higher rate than the workers in these M-IntD
relationships.
The outcomes for treatment LowT sampled atgeneration 1000 closely resemble the outcomes reported
in Table 6and Table 7for treatment ZeroT sampled at generation 12. The first attractor state comprises
nine runs, the second attractor state comprises seven runs, and only four runs appear as transition states.
In the first attractor state the workers and employers attain average mean market power levels of-0.06
and -0.05, respectively. In the second attractor state the workers and employers attain uniformly lower
but balanced average mean market power levels of -0.17 and -0.18, respectively. As in Table 7, this
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balance hides an underlying volatility in shirking rates across runs. Finally, the first attractor state is
strongly dominated by M-AllC relationships, and the second attractor state is strongly dominated by M-
IntD relationships. Mixed types of relationships are almost entirely absent in the two attractor states.
Table 8 reports market non-participation rates, work-site behaviors, utility levels, and market power
outcomes for the twenty runs constituting treatment HighT, sampled at generation 12. Table 9 reports
persistent relationship type counts for these same runs, again sampled at generation 12.
- INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE -
~ INSERT TABLE 9 ABOOT HERE ~
As for the previous two treatments, the twenty runs can be clustered into two attractor states together with
a scattering of transition states. Moreover, once again the runs in the j&rst attractor state exhibit perfectly
(or almost perfectly) latchedpersistentnetworics with a high percentageof AllC agent types.
Nevertheless, the nature of the secondattractorstate is dramaticallydifferent. Whereas in the previous
two treatments the second attractor state was dominated by M-IntD relationships, now the second
attractor state corresponds to complete or almost complete coordination feilure. More precisely, the
network distance for the runs in the second attractor state varies fi^om 22 (only two persistent
relationships) to 24 (no persistent relationships). With a high non-employment payoff, agents are opting
for non-employment rather than choosing to remain in M-IntD relationships.
It is interesting to observe how these outcomes for treatment HighT vary fi-om generation 12 to
generation 1000. In generation 12, the first attractor state comprises five runs, the second attractor state
comprises 9 runs, and the six remaining runs are scattered across transition states. Also, in the first
attractor state, an average of 9.8 out of the 12 persistent relationships in each run are M-AIIC. By
generation 1000, however, the first attractor state comprises 11 runs, the second attractor state comprises
seven runs, and only two runs are in a transition state. Moreover, in the first attractor state, an average of
10.73 out of the 12 persistent relationships in each run are M-AllC. This suggests a movement over time
toward increased coordination on the first attractor state in which M-AllC relationships are dominant.
Summarizing the relative market power outcomes of workers and employers in each treatment, the
following regularities are observed. For every treatment, in each sampled generation, the employers
consistently attain a higher average market power level than workers in the cooperative fiirst attractor
state. This difference is attributable to the relatively higher (although small) incidence ofNPD, IntD, and
AIID behaviors among employers and to the feet that offer costs are borne solely by the workers. Also,
for treatments ZeroT and HighT, the workers and employers attain essentially the same average market
power levels in the second attiactor state in each sampled generation; and the same is true for tr^tment
LowT when sampled in generation 1000. A balanced market power level in the second attractor state
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indicates either that workers and employers have essentially the same shirking rates on average
(treatments ZeroT and LowT) or that all agents are persistently non-employed (treatment HighT).
With regard to market power in the cooperative first attractor state compared across treatments, the
workers attain a modestly negative average market power level in each treatment in each sampled
generation; the levels range from -0.05 to -0..14. Interestingly, treatments LowT and HighT have a lower
average incidence ofNPD behavior and a higher average percentage ofM^AllC relationships per run than
treatment ZeroT in this first attractor state. Nevertheless, these advantages ^e offset (in market power
terms) by the higher average offer costs incurred, by. workers due to.the longer time taken within each
generation to establish a persistent network. (For example, as seen in Table 8 for treatment HighT
sampled at generation 12, only one run in the first attractor state attains a network distance of 12, i.e., a
perfectly latchedpersistentnetwork.) In contrastto theworkers, employers do not incur offer costs, hence
they att^ closeto a zeroaverage market power level in.each treatment at ^ch sampled generation in tiie
cooperative first attractor state; the levels range fi-om -0.01 to -0.06.
With regard tomarket power in the second attractor state compared across treatments, ineach sampled
generation boththeworkers andthe employers attain their lowest average levels in treatment HighT: The
second attractor state in treatment HighT is characterized'by complete or.nearly complete coordination
feilure. I > ,
Finally, pooling all ixms together for each treatment at each sampled generation, the following results
areobtained forMP, the average market power level attained peragent. Forall sampled generations, MP
isuniformly lower.in treatment ZeroT thanintreatments LowT orHighT. Forgenerations 12and 50,MP
is highest in treatment LowT. Bygeneration 1000, however, MP is highest in treatment HighT. The
latter finding reflects the -previously noted observation that agents in' treatment HighT become
increasingly more successful at coordinating on persistent mutual cooperation (the first attractor slate)
rather than persistent non-employment (the second attractor state) in each successive sampled generation.
Never-ProvokedDefection in the Three Treatments
The importance ofstance toward strangers and first impressions for determining subsequent outcomes
in sequential interactions has been stressed by Orbell and Dawes (1993) and by Rabin and Schrag (1999).
In the computational experiment, two sharply differentiated attractor states exist for each treatment, Ihe
first dominated by persistent mutual cooperation- and the second dominated either by persistent
intermittent defection or by persistent non-employment.:Thus, outcomes are strongly path dependent, and
stance towards strangers and first impressions could play a critical role in determining these outcomes.
These aspects ofagent behavior are captured by counts ofnever-provoked defection (NPD).
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In treatments ZeroT and LowT, NPD is commonly observed in all sampled generations, particularly in
the second attractor state dominated by persistent intermittent defection (IntD). For example, as seen in
Table 6 for treatment ZeroT sampled at generation 12, 33% ofworkers and 38% of employers engage in
NPD in the first attractor state, and these percentages rise to 52% and 83%, respectively, for the second
attractor state. It would appear that these high percentages for NPD in the second attractor state might
actually be inducing the resulting predominance of IntD as agents engage in retaliatory defections.
Because the non-employment payoff is lower than the mutual defection payoff in these two treatments,
agents tend to defect back against defecting partners rather than simply refiising to interact with them.
Another interesting observation about these two treatments is that the incidence ofNPD for each agent
type in each attractor state tends to be higher in treatment ZeroT than in treatment LowT. In treatment
ZeroT, the non-employment payoff 0 lies below all work-site payoffs, including the "sucker" payoff
L=10 earned by an agent who cooperates against a defecting partner. Consequently, there is no risk of
refusal on the basis of bad behavior alone, but only from unfavorable comparisons with other agents. In
contrast, in treatment LowT the non-employment payoff 15 lies between the sucker payoff and the mutual
defectionpayoffD=20. In this case, then, an opportunistic agent faces a higher risk of refiisal since non-
employment is preferred to a sucker payoff.
In treatmentHighT the non-employment payoff 30 lies above the mutual defection payoff for the first
time, and the impact of this change in payoff configuration is substantial. For example, as reported in
Table8, only 13%of workers and 7% of employers in generation 12 engage in NPD in the first attractor
state characterized by mutual cooperation. In contrast, 100% of e^h agent type engages in NPD in the
second attractor state characterized by complete or almost complete coordination failure. The same
pattern holds at generation 50 and generation 1000. Agents are now much picker with regard to their
partners; an earlydefection from a partner drops thatpartner's expected utility assessment below the non-
employmentpayoffand hence belowminimumtolerability.
6. Comparison of Human-Subject and Computational Experiment Results
6.i. Networkformation in the Two Experiments
In both the human-subject and computational experiments, the number of employment relationships
decreases as the non-employment payoff increases. An increasing number of woricers and employers
choose inactivity in preference to engaging in risky woik-site interactions.
Nevertheless, Ae interaction networks among those who choose to remain in the labormarket exhibit
substantial differences in the two experiments. In the computational experiment, as seen in Figure 7,
almost ever\' employed worker ends up ina continuous long-term relationship with a single employer. In
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contrast, as seen in Table 2, recurrent relationships are' dominant in the human-subject experiment;"
latched relationships are only rarely observed. • . >-
Akey explanation for this difference lies in the specification ofthe offer cost in relation to the scale of
each experiment. In an attempt to run parallel experiments, the same low value of 1.0 was used for the
offer cost ineach experiment. Nevertheless, in the computational experiment, we chose to include twelve
workers and twelve employers in order to sustain "genetic diversity" in the pool of work-site rules for
genetic-algorithm learning purposes. In contrast," for the human-subject experiment, we chose to include
only three workers andthree employers in order to keep theexperiment jfrom becoming unwieldy.
The offer cost is incurred per work offer. Consequently, the difference in scale between the two
experiments implies thata worker ina recurrent network can end upmaking a substantially larger number
of work offers per trade cycle in the computational experiment than in the human-subject experiment.
Thisarises because, in the computational experiment, there are fourtimes as many employers perworker.
Consequently, if workers are randomly or intermittently directing work offers across employers without
latching, and each employer has only one job opening, there is a much greater risk of accumulating a
largenumber of refusals before employment is secured. It follows that a recurrent network is much more
costly for workers to maintain in the computational experiment. Indeed, an example' of this is seen in
Table 9 for treatment HighT sampled at-generation 12. Workers attain a relatively low mean market
power level in the transition-state runs in which recurrent relationships dominate, despite the feet that a
veiy high percentage of the workers and employers in these recurrent relationships are engaging in
mutually cooperative behavior.
This potential for'accumulatirig large numbers of refusals, hence offer costs, in a recurrent network
also explains why latched networks are so much -more prevalent in the computational experiment.
Refusals lower the expected utility assessments of the employers doing the refusing and encourage
workers to latch on to any employer who does hire them.
A conjecture that follows from these observations is that latching behavior should become more
prevalent in the human-subject experiment as the offer cost is increased or, alternatively, as the number of
workers and employers is proportionally increased while retaining zero excess capacity.
6.2.MarketNon-Participation Rates in the TwoExperiments
Unemployment and vacancy rates in the computational experiment are easily characterized. In
treatments ZeroT and t.owT, both r^es are close to 0% for all runs in all sampled generations lying in
either ofthe two attractor states. See, for example.Table 6.
In treatment HighT, the unemployment and vacancy rates show some evolution over time. When nms
are sampled at generation 12, the average unemployment and vacancy rates are 10% and 12%,
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respectively, in the first attractor state dominated by mutual cooperation, and both average rates are
approximately 97% in the second attractor state dominated by complete or near-complete coordination
failure. (See Table 8.) "When the runs for treatment HighT are instead sampled at generation 50 and
generation 1000, the average unemployment and vacancy rates are close to 0% in all runs in the first
attractor state dominated by mutual cooperation and equal to 100% in the second attractor state
characterized by complete coordination failure.
Qualitatively similar results are obtained in the human-subject experiment. For example, as depicted
in Figure3, the unemployment rate (averaged over all workers in all five sessions) is substantially higher
in treatment HighT than in treatments ZeroT and LowT.
Onthe otherhand. Figure 3 also shows thatthehigher unemployment rate for treatment HighT in the
human-subject experiment is particularly marked in the last few trade cycles; that is, the average
unemployment rate in treatment HighT seems to increase as the human subjects become more
experienced. This phenomenon is not observed for the computational experiment. Indeed, to the
contrary, the computational workers and employers in treatment HighT become better at coordinating on
mutual cooperation and avoiding coordination failure in each successive sampled generation. This is
indicatedby a monotonic growth in the size of the cooperative first attractor state.
This latter difference may perhaps be arising due to the relatively optimistic specification of initial
expected utility assessments in the computational experiment. For tiie first generation of agents, initial
expected utility assessments are set equal to the mutual cooperation payoff, and these optimistic initial
assessments are then reconstituted for each successive generation of agents. This reconstituted optimism
ensures that each successive generation of agents in the computational experiment keeps attempting to
participate in the labormarketevenif theyhaveexperienced badpayoff outcomes in the past.
In contrast, the participants in the human-subject experiment appear to become discouraged rather
quicklywhen they cooperate against a defecting partaer. In particular, once subjects in treatment HighT
opted for inactivity during a particular trade cycle, they tended to remain inactive for the remainder of
their sessions.
6.S. UnprovokedBehavior andReciprocity in the Two Experiments
In the human subject experiment, unprovoked defection (UD) and unprovoked cooperation (UC)
represent actions taken unilaterally in relationships with less femiliar partners, while reciprocal defection
(RD) and reciprocal cooperation (RC) are mutuality actions that can arise in relationships with more
femiliar partners. In the computational experiment, never-provoked defection (NPD) characterizes
actionstaken unilaterally with strangersor in (typically early) interactionswith fiilly cooperative partners.
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while mutual cooperation (M-AllC), mutual defection (M-AIID). and mutual intermittent defection (M-
IntD) represent mutuality patterns that canemerge in persistent relationships with more femiliar partners.
Examining behavior when the partner is less familiar, the incidence of UD in the human-subject
experiment was higher in treatment HighT than in treatments LowT and ZeroT. The results of the
computational experiment were similar in that the move to the high non-employment payoff in treatment
HighT led to an extremely high incidence of NPD in the second attractor state associated with persistent
non-employment. Thus, a consistent message obtained from our experiments is that a high non-
employment payoff leads to a greater incidence of aggressive defection behavior, which then leads to
non-employment.
In addition, however, in every treatment for the computational experiment, mutual cooperation was the
dominant behavior in the first attractor state. This, then, highlights a second possibility. Namely, if a
worker and employer are "nice" or 'fair" and do not aggressively defect in their initial few interactions
with each other, then the outcome will tend to be a productive cooperative employment relationship rather
than persistent intermittent defection or non-employment. Some of this mutual cooperation was indeed
observed between pairs of agents in the human-subject experiment in both the LowT and HighT
treatments.
Examining human-subject behavior when the partner is more femihar, the rates of reciprocal
cooperation in the final trade cycle 12 were comparable for the HighT and ZeroT treatments, while the
rate of reciprocal cooperation was significantly higher in the LowT treatment. These results are generally
consistent with those obtained for the computational experiment when we consider average behavior
across both attractor states for each treatment.
More precisely, in the computational experiment, reciprocal cooperation (in the form of M-AllC
relationships) dominated the first attractor state in all three treatments. However, mutual intermittent
defection was the dominant relationship in Ihe second attractor state in treatments ZeroT and LowT
whereas persistent non-employment was the dominant outcome in the second attractor state in treatment
PiighT. Sampled at generation 12, for example, the average incidence of M-AllC relationships across
both attractor states was 0.4 per run for treatment ZeroT (see Table 7) and 3.5 per run for treatment HighT
(see Table 9). In contrast, sampled at generation 12, the average incidence ofM-AIIC relationships across
both attractor states was 6.0 per run for treatment LowT.
Thus, another consistent message obtained fi'om the two experiments is that a zero non-employment
payoffmaydeter reciprocal cooperation by promoting toomuch intermittent defection while a high non-
employment payoff may deter reciprocal cooperation by luringagents into inactivity.
One interesting issue raised bythese comparisons is the treatment of purely transient relationships. In
the computational experiment, thefocus is on whole relationships rather than actions within relationships.
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and only persistent relationships are considered in the counts of mutual (reciprocal) cooperation and
defection. In contrast, in the human-subject experiment, reciprocal cooperation and reciprocal defection
are measured on the basis of incidences of paired-action behaviors within relationships, even if these
relationships are transient in nature.
The implications of these di^erences in definition are vividly illustrated by the different conclusion
reached in the two experiments regarding reciprocal defection in treatmentHighT. For the computational
experiment, as reported in Table 9, the conclusion reached is that reciprocal defection (in the form of M-
AllD or balanced M-IntD relationships) is virtually absent. For the human-subject experiment, as
reported in Table 3 (regression 1), the conclusion reached is that reciprocal defection is prevalent. The
apparent discrepancy is resolved, however, by the following observation. Although almost every action
taken by the computational workers and employers in the second attractor in treatment HighT is a
defection, none of these defections contributes toward the measure of reciprocal defection because no
agent manages to form any persistent relationships. In contrast, any defection in response to a defection
would count as an incidence of reciprocal defection in the human-subject experiment, whether or not the
relationship as a whole was transient or persistent.
The important point raised by these observations for human-subject and computational
experimentalists is that time scale matters greatly. From the vantagepoint of the 150^^ trade c>cle in
generation 1000 in the computational experiment, characterizing the behaviors expressed in transient
relationships terminating in earlier trade cycles, let alone earlier generations, may seem to be a waste of
lime. However, as stressedby Roth and Erev (1995), such transient relationships may be where life in the
real world predominantly takes place.
6.4.Market Power Outcomes in the TwoExperiments
Our market power definition measures the utility level of an agent relative to the utility level that the
agent would attain in a theoretical competitive equilibrium with no transaction costs. In both types of
experiments, the mean market power levels attained by workers and employers are generally negative.
This finding stems from the presence of transaction costs in the form of woric offer costs and from the
inability ofagents to achieve the level of cooperation assumed in the competitive equilibrium.
A second consistency between the two experiments is that the mean market power of employers tends
to exceed that of workers, even when the employers and workers are mutually cooperating. This occurs
because workers bear all of the transaction costs associated with the formation and maintenance of
employment relationships.
A third fundamental consistency between the two experiments is that agents in treatment ZeroT tend to
attain lower average maricet power levels than agents in treatments LowT or HighT. Two fectors explain
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this finding. First, agents in treatment ZeroT who choose to be non-employed do not receive a positive
non-employment benefit. Second, the absence of a positive non-employment benefit encourages agents
to engage in more shirking and less cooperation in their work-site interactions.
Of particular interest is the finding in the computational experiment that the meanmaricet power of an
average agent is highest in treatment LowT for generations 12 and 50 but highest in treatmentHighT for
generation 1000. Two fectors explain this pattem. First, the increase in the non-employment payoff
tends to increase the incidence of mutual cooperation in any employment relationships that form. Second,
as time goes by, more agents learn that a higher payoffcanbe attained through mutual cooperation in an
employment relationship than in non-employment, so that the absolute number of employment
relationships increases.
This finding casts an interesting light on the human-subject experiment. In the latter, the meanmarket
power levels were comparable for treatments LowT and HighT, but subjects in treatment HighT did
exhibit a significantly higher rate of unprovoked cooperation. That is, some subjects in treatment HighT
were exceptionally willing to risk receiving the lowest "sucker" payoff in order to pursue the rent
associated with cooperative employment. The long-run mean success of treatment HighT agents in the
computational experiment suggests that the aggressive pursuit of cooperative employment exhibited by
HighT subjects in the human-subject experiment may have long-run implications. In particular, given a
long enough time span, the mean welfare of the human subjects in treatment HighT might exceed the
welfare of subjects in treatment LowT as well as in treatment ZeroT.
7. Conclusion
The results fi-om the human-subject and computational experiments illustrate how the level of a non-
employment payoff can influence economic outcomes by influencing the evolution of cooperation. Of
particular interest is the finding that increasing the non-employment payoff effectively filtere out
employers and workers who are more likely to shirk, so that the productivity of the average employment
relationship increases. In addition, as the non-employment payoff increases, the computational
experiment suggests that a greater number of agents leam over time to coordinate on mutual cooperation
and avoid coordination failure, so that overall efficiency increases as well.
While we did find evidence in the human-subject experiment that some subjects seem to be "naturally"
more cooperative than others, findings from both the human-subject and computational experiments
suggest that the level of cooperation tends to evolve as agents leam from their environment The
computational experiment illustrates that environment and chance can both have an influence on this
evolutionary process. When the non-employment payoff is high, the computational labor market either
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evolves towards a highly productive economy where everyone is cooperative or towards economic
collapse with 100percentunemployment. Thedifference between approaching one attractor stateversus
anotherdepends upon which agents happen to pair up in the early stages of the evolutionary process, and
howthey happen to behave in these pairings. This path dependence suggests that, while a change in the
level of the non-employment payoff may have substantial effects on key economic outcomes such as
unemployment and averageproduaivity, the standard deviation of these outcomes couldbe quitelarge.
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Table 1: Human-Subject Experimental Design
Treatment
ZeroT LowT Hisht
Non-employment Payoff 0 15 30
Sessions per treatment 5 • 5 5
Workers per session 3 3 3
Employers per session 3 3 3
Trade cycles per session 12 12 12
Matching rounds per trade cycle Endogenous Endogenous Endogenous
Table 2: Human-Su )iect Network Formation
Latched Recurrent Transient
HighT 2.2 28.9 68.9
LowT 13.3 48.9 37.8
ZeroT 6.7 71.1 22.2
Table 3: Determinants ofHuman-Subject Work Site Behavior
' Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3
Unprovoked Defection
ZEROT .51** 1.39** .92
LOWT .36** 126** .92
HIGHT 1.38** 2.21** 1.46
CYCLE t.14** -.14**
GPA
- .69**
FAIR -3.70**
Reciprocal Defection
ZEROT .78** -.14 .72
LOWT .13 -.81** .23
HIGHT .78** -.11 .37 .
• CYCLE - :i2** 12**
. GPA - • - .26
FAIR ' . - - - -3.41**
Unprovoked Cooperation . -
ZEROT .11 1.46** . • 1.63
LOWT .11 1.50** ' 1.83
HIGHT .73** 1 2.02** 1.93*
CYCLE -.24** -.24** •
GPA .39
FAIR -2.74**
UnemplovedWorker ....
ZEROT -2.98** - -3.28** -6.55**
LOWT -1.64** -1.95** -5.52**
RIGHT .04 -.25 -3.81**
CYCLE .04 .04
GPA 2,00**
FAIR -7.76**
Discouraged Employer
ZEROT -4.08** -4.92 -1.21
LOWT -2.60** -3.46 .19
HIGHT .23 -.58 2.16
CYCLE .11** .12**
GPA -.04
FAIR -7.68**
Inactivity
ZEROT -2.39** -3.42** -1.09
LOWT -.87** -1.62** .94
HIGHT 1.41** .72* 2.51**
CYCLE 10** ,,.10**
GPA -.12
FAIR -3.88**
.155 .202 .225
♦♦Significantat 5% level o 'Significance
♦Significantat 10% level ofsignificance
Table 4: Human-Subject Shirkins Rate and Relationshi pTypes
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4
Independent Var. S MC MD SD
HIGHT .61** .14** .36** .25**
LOWT .53** .24** .30** .23**
ZEROT .38** .33** .08 .29**
HIGHT*CYCLE .011 .002 .023** -.013*
LOWT*CYCLE
1
o
«
o
1—•
00
*
-.005 -.006
2ER0T*CYCLE .042** -.022** .061** -.019**
R' .76 .59 .67 .16
♦Significantat 10%level of significance
Table 5: Computational Experimental Design
Treatment
ZeroT LowT HighT
Non-Employment PayoffLevel 0 15 30
Rims per Treatment 20 20 20
Workers per Run 12 12 12
Employers per Run 12 12 12
Generations per Run 1000 1000 1000
Trade Cycles per Generation 150 150 150
Matching Rounds per Trade Cycle Endogenous Endogenous Endogenous
Generations Sampled 12,50,1000 12, 50, 1000 12, 50,1000
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